

NUCLEAR SAFETY BULLETIN

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR SAFETY IN HUNGARY

JUNE 2026

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Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

GENERAL

2025 ANNUAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES


The Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) regularly evaluates the safety performance of operators of nuclear facilities. The main sources of data for the assessment are regular reports and event reports of the licensees, as well as records of regulatory inspections.

A brief extract is provided below from the 2025 annual safety performance assessment.

Paks Nuclear Power Plant

In 2025, 18 reportable events occurred. Of these events, four were related to the availability of the spent fuel pool cooling circuits, three to the instrumentation circuits of the main circulation pumps, and three to the drives of the control and safety protection rods. One event was caused by an electrical fault, while seven were due to human error.

REPORTABLE EVENTS




NUMBER OF REPORTABLE EVENTS
RATED TO DIFFERENT INES LEVELS




Seventeen reportable events were classified as “below scale,” corresponding to Level 0 on the seven-level International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). The final rating of one event was INES Level 1 (the lowest level on the scale indicating an anomaly) due to a series of human errors that led to the event.

There was no OLC (Operational Limits and Conditions) violation in 2025.

OLC VIOLATION




REACTOR PROTECTION ACTUATION



In 2025, there was no SCRAM-I reactor protection activation resulting in an immediate shutdown, six SCRAM-III reactor protection activation occurred: two were caused by inadequate human performance, three by spurious process signals, and in one case, the inadvertent opening of the turbine control valves led to reactor protection system actuation.

The collective dose for workers in 2025 increased slightly compared with the previous year, but remained low, in line with previous years.


COLLECTIVE DOSE [MAN*Sv]




Budapest Research Reactor

No reportable events occurred at the Budapest Research Reactor in 2025.

REPORTABLE EVENTS




BUTE Training Reactor




No reportable events occurred at the Training Reactor in 2025.

In 2025, no safety system failure occurred.

SAFETY SYSTEM FAILURES




Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility



In 2025, the collective dose of workers increased compared with the previous year. The increase occurred in the first half of the year and was associated with unplanned maintenance and outage activities carried out in addition to fuel assembly storage operations.

In 2025, four reportable events occurred at the Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility. All four events were caused by technical failures.

REPORTABLE EVENTS



LEGAL CHANGES IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2026

Act XI of 2026

In 2026, the Hungarian nuclear energy regulation reached a significant milestone: the Hungarian Parliament adopted Act XI of 2026, which amended Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy (the Atomic Energy Act). The purpose of the amendment is to establish rules concerning the establishment and regulatory supervision of small modular reactors into the Atomic Energy Act.

Relevant details can be found in the article below.

HAEA Decree 1/2026. (I. 22.) of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

HAEA Decree 1/2026. (I. 22.), which entered into force on 22 January 2026, regulates the standby remuneration of civil servants employed by the HAEA. The essence of the regulation is that compensation for standby duty is provided in the form of a monetary allowance rather than time off.

An additional element of the regulation is that the President of the HAEA reviews the amount of the allowance annually – no later than 31 January – thus allowing for its regular adjustment.

ESTABLISHING REGULATIONS FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS

On 10 March 2026, the Parliament adopted Act XI of 2026 amending the Atomic Energy Act, which establishes the domestic regulatory framework for small modular reactors (SMRs).

SMRs are typically smaller and of lower power output than conventional nuclear power plants, and their standardised, often modular design enables serial production and accelerated construction. Depending on the SMR technology applied, they can be used for various applications beyond electricity generation, such as district heating, industrial process heat supply and hydrogen production, and their distinctive technical features may often allow for flexible load-following operation. Since some types can be sited directly adjacent to end-users, they may become attractive investment targets for the private sector – particularly where energy demand is large and continuous: at steel and chemical plants, data centres, or server farms serving artificial intelligence infrastructure, whose electricity consumption has grown exponentially in recent years.

The two new options introduced by the legislative amendment – **professional consultation** and **preliminary opinion** – are available as fee-based services and contribute to more efficient case preparation and to the development of consistent regulatory practice. The former may be requested in relation to any nuclear facility, while the latter is available exclusively in respect of SMR units and SMR facilities, regarding the engineering solutions or documentation to be applied. In both cases, a prerequisite is that no regulatory proceeding is pending on the subject matter. The preliminary opinion is, as a general rule, binding on the HAEA within its period of validity, provided that the underlying facts and the content of the documentation remain unchanged.

The new regulation introduces an entirely new licensing logic tailored to the specific characteristics of SMRs: **type licensing** enables the assessment of reactor technology before the selection of a specific site. Where an SMR technology already holds a type licence, the construction licensing primarily focuses on whether the reactor technology can be deployed by the specific facility arrangement at the given site.

The **construction and commissioning programme** consolidates the previously separate system- and component-level licenses and notification procedures into a single, living process, superseding the traditional commissioning licence as well. The operating licence for SMRs will be of indefinite duration; the precondition for continued operation is a Periodic Safety Review (PSR) conducted at least every ten years and approved by the HAEA. According to the explanatory memorandum to the proposal, the HAEA may, where justified, set a shorter review interval – for example, as the facility approaches the end of its planned operational lifetime, in order to address the effects of ageing and obsolescence.

The legislative amendment also defines the methodology for calculating contributions by SMR operators to the Central Nuclear Financial Fund and establishes a technology-neutral minimum with respect to the impact area and safety zone, delegating their specific determination to the HAEA.

The details of the SMR regulatory framework are to be determined by a set of decrees of the President of the HAEA; the technical preparation of these decrees is already under way within the Authority.

NEARLY THREE HUNDRED STUDENTS ATTENDED “ABOUT ATOMIC ENERGY – FOR EVERYONE” EVENT IN SZEGED

The second event of “About Atomic Energy – For Everyone” series in 2025, held in Szeged on 18 November in cooperation with the University of Szeged, concluded with great success. Organized by the HAEA and the TIT Studio Association, the fully booked event, attended by nearly three hundred participants, offered an engaging and interactive programme for both students and teachers.



The scientific presentations related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the online quiz game fostering active participation from students, and the interactive exhibition all contributed to making the educational programme both informative and entertaining.

Following a presentation on ionizing radiation, participants were introduced to the application of nuclear energy in the 21st century and to fusion energy production and were provided with an overview of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Finally, they were given forward-looking insights into the application of nuclear energy in outer space. In

In addition to the presentations, visitors explored the various applications of nuclear energy and radioactive waste management at the interactive exhibition, took a virtual tour of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant using VR headsets, conducted radiation measurements, and engaged directly in discussions with experts. The online quiz game held between presentations proved highly popular again: students answered questions related to the lectures via a mobile application, competing with one another in real time.

LAUNCH OF THE HAEA SAFETY CULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Safety is not only a matter of regulations, but also of mindset. For this reason, the HAEA is launching a comprehensive programme in the coming years to strengthen safety culture, ensuring that nuclear safety becomes an integral part of everyday operations from decision-making to daily professional activities.



The essence of safety culture is that everyone within the organisation (both leaders and staff) feels responsible for safety, communicates openly about emerging issues, and learns from experience. It is not an additional task, but a mindset that defines how we carry out our work.

As a first step of the programme, the Authority will assess the current state of its safety culture through questionnaires, interviews and internal evaluations. This will be followed by a strong focus on enhancing open communication and feedback culture, introducing training and awareness-raising tools to support staff, and establishing a unified reporting and learning system. The aim of the initiative is to make safety a shared value and ensure that it is reflected at all levels of the organisation's operation.

PAKS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

PREPARATION FOR THE SUBSEQUENT LIFETIME EXTENSION

The HAEA has initiated preparations for the regulatory activities related to the subsequent lifetime extension (SSLE) of Paks Nuclear Power Plant. The objective of these efforts is to ensure that future licence applications can be assessed in a consistent, well-founded and efficient manner.

A key element of the preparation process has been the review and, where necessary, amendment of the regulatory framework. In this context, the term of further operation after operation beyond the planned operating time has been incorporated into the relevant legislation, providing a clear legal basis for regulatory procedures. Particular attention was given to ensuring that the new provisions are aligned with the existing framework for lifetime extension.

In parallel, the HAEA has started the review of the related regulatory guides. The aim is to develop up-to-date guidance that reflects international experience and supports both the regulatory assessment and the licensee's preparation activities.

As part of the preparation, the HAEA also organized an internal professional workshop, during which staff reviewed the main regulatory tasks related to further operation, identified potential challenges, and aligned the basis for a consistent regulatory approach. The event marked the first step of a planned series of professional discussions aimed at further deepening the regulatory preparedness and developing a unified position.

The HAEA will continue its preparatory activities to ensure that nuclear safety requirements are maintained at a high level during the authorization of SSLE.

PAKS II PROJECT

REGULATORY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE FIRST CONCRETE POURING FOR UNIT 5 OF THE NEW NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

The site preparation works required for the construction of Units 5 and 6 of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant — including soil improvement, cut-off wall construction and soil excavation — were carried out on the basis of building permits issued by the HAEA, so the process leading to the first concrete pouring was, from the outset, closely under regulatory oversight. In the decision for construction works of the soil improvement the HAEA prescribed that, upon completion of the soil improvement works, a separate occupancy permitting procedure had to be conducted. Soil improvement beneath the nuclear island of Unit 5 began in the autumn of 2023, followed by soil excavation to the design level — reaching depths of up to 23 metres in some areas — started on 24 September 2024.

In parallel with the licensing procedures for the cut-off wall and soil improvement, Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant Ltd (Paks II. Ltd.) submitted applications for building permits for the nuclear island structures of Unit 5 on 30 December 2021. According to the design, the Reactor Building, Auxiliary Building, Steam Cell, Safety Building, Control Building and Switching Chamber are to be constructed on a common foundation slab, while the Containment Access Building is placed on a separate foundation slab. HAEA granted the relevant building permits for these structures on 30 August 2022. The permits established so-called hold points, the fulfilment of which was a prerequisite for the start of the concreting of the common foundation slab. These hold points required the submission of detailed design-level technical substantiations, including the waterproofing solution of the foundation slab, the qualification of structural materials, as well as detailed structural and seismic dynamic analyses.

Accordingly, construction of the buildings of the nuclear island of Unit 5 could commence only after full compliance with the conditions of the relevant building permits, the acceptance of the hold points, and the issuance of an occupancy permit for the soil improvement within the nuclear island area. On 28 August 2024, Paks II. Ltd. submitted applications for modified building permits for three buildings: the Control Building, the Steam Cell, and the Auxiliary Building. Subsequently, on 3 December 2024, Paks II. Ltd. submitted an application for a partial occupancy permit for the soil improvement works of the nuclear island of Unit 5. Within the framework of that procedure, HAEA examined whether the completed works were suitable for their intended and safe use. On 4 November 2025, HAEA issued the partial occupancy permit for the soil improvement of the Unit 5 nuclear island, subject to conditions. These requirements were aimed at upholding the primacy of nuclear safety, ensuring the long-term service life of the nuclear island and the lasting stability of the site, and enabling the timely detection and management of deviations and unfavourable ground conditions.

On the same day, HAEA also approved the modification of the building permits for the Control Building, the Steam Cell and the Auxiliary Building, while emphasizing that the conditions and hold points of the original decisions not affected by the amendments remained in force. From the last quarter of 2024 onward, Paks II. Ltd. submitted, in several stages, the documentation required for the fulfilment of the hold points prescribed in the building permit for the Control Building. HAEA examined all submitted documents and based on that review, released the hold points related to the foundation slab of the Control Building on 19 December 2025 and 26 January 2026. With this — together with the partial occupancy permit issued for the soil improvement — the technical and administrative prerequisites within HAEA's competence for the first concrete pouring were fulfilled. At the same time, Paks II. Ltd. remained obliged to fulfil the hold points related to the superstructures before the start of those later construction phases.

The works directly preceding the first concrete pouring also formed part of this regulated and supervised process. On 11 November 2025, Paks II. Ltd. began construction of the levelling concrete structure for the Control Building of Unit 5. The structure was constructed in three layers with steel mesh to control cracks, waterproofing and a grounding grid, after which the reinforcement of the foundation slab and other preparatory works not directly affecting the

concreting itself were completed. During these activities, HAEA continuously supervised the construction through on-site inspections.



First concrete pouring at Bay 1.1 of the foundation slab for the Control building of Unit 5

The first major milestone of the construction process was the pouring of the first concrete. In the terminology of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database, the official start date of construction of a nuclear power plant is the date on which the first major concrete is poured for the foundation slab of the reactor building. Accordingly, a nuclear power plant is considered to be under construction from the moment of the first concrete pouring. In this project, the term first concrete means the commencement of concreting works for the common foundation slab of the Unit 5 nuclear island building complex, including the Reactor Building, beginning with the section beneath the Control Building of Unit 5. The first concrete pouring on that section started on 5 February 2026.

The technical implementation of the first concrete pouring was also significant from a regulatory perspective, since it took place only after the fulfilment of the conditions prescribed by HAEA. A key requirement for the foundation slab structure was that the risk of cracks caused by thermal stresses and shrinkage during concrete curing had to be minimized. The detailed requirements for the concreting of the foundation slab were laid down in the relevant technical instruction. The thickness of the foundation slab and thus the first concrete section was 2.7 m; 329 m³ of

concrete was poured, 133 t of rebar was built in, and two concrete pumps were employed during placement. The concrete grade was C35/45-XC3-XF1-XV3(H)-16-F5-100 according to MSZ 4798, and the concrete mix was compacted using a submersible electric vibrator.

The initial curing and hardening period following the pouring was of critical importance, which is why keeping the concrete surface under ideal conditions, protecting it from direct sunlight and wind, and maintaining the required temperature and humidity conditions received particular attention. During and after the pouring, a tent ensured the appropriate environmental conditions, and the concrete was also protected by thermal insulation. Temperature was continuously monitored using sensors installed in the concrete, while removal of the insulation and the formwork took place on the basis of laboratory test results.

Overall, the first concrete pouring for Unit 5 was not a single construction event, but the result of a sequence of regulatory decisions, permitting procedures, reviews and inspections, all of which were necessary to ensure that this milestone could be reached in full compliance with nuclear safety requirements.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE WENRA WGWD

The objective of the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) Working Group on Waste and Decommissioning (WGWD), which focuses on the management, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste, as well as the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, is to promote the harmonisation of regulatory requirements in these areas across European member states.

WENRA member states have committed themselves to ensuring that their national regulatory requirements are aligned with the requirements published by WENRA, namely the Safety Reference Levels (SRLs). In this context, within the framework of the WGWD, delegates of each member state are required to demonstrate in detail that all provisions prescribed by the SRLs are fully reflected in their national legislation. Any identified gaps must subsequently be addressed, most commonly through clarification or supplementation of the regulatory framework.

The most recent relevant WENRA report is the Report on Radioactive Waste Treatment and Conditioning Safety Reference Levels. At the plenary working group meeting held in March 2026, following several years of preparatory work, the delegates of the HAEA presented, the compliance of Hungarian legislation with the SRLs related to radioactive waste treatment and conditioning. Following a rigorous review, the WGWD concluded that, out of the 71 Reference Levels, full compliance had been achieved in 66 cases, while acceptable compliance was established in the remaining 5 cases. Consequently, the WGWD approved that the current Hungarian regulatory framework complies with the SRL set out in the WGWD report on

radioactive waste treatment and conditioning, thereby successfully concluding the related compliance assessment process.

The currently applicable Hungarian regulatory framework also demonstrates a very high level of compliance with the SRL sets contained in the other WGWD reports. Full compliance had already been demonstrated earlier with respect to all 108 SRLs related to radioactive waste disposal facilities (Report on Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities Safety Reference Levels). Similarly, full compliance was achieved regarding the 62 SRLs assigned to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities (Report on Decommissioning Safety Reference Levels), as well as the 61 SRLs contained in the report addressing the storage of radioactive waste (Report on Waste and Spent Fuel Storage Safety Reference Levels). In the area of compliance related to the storage of spent fuel assemblies, a limited number of issues still remain to be addressed.

Hungary will host the second WGWD plenary working group meeting of 2026, scheduled for September 2026. The planned technical visit will be hosted by Public Limited Company for Radioactive Waste Management (PURAM), while the meetings themselves will be hosted by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority.

The summary reports containing the SRL sets issued by WGWD are available at the following website: <https://wenra.eu/wgwd>



A SERIES OF EVENTS INVOLVING THE SFISF STORAGE TUBES

At the beginning of 2026, the PURAM reported several event in connection with various problems of the Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility's (SFISF) storage tubes. These are:

- During loading, the surface of a storage tube was mechanically damaged at several points, which was repaired on site.

- During transfer, damage was identified on the sealing surface of a storage tube, which was clearly visible to the eye, but was still small in size. The tight seal of the storage tube was ensured throughout the operations with this storage tube.
- During the servicing of a storage tube, the required pressure value could not be ensured. Even after two gaskets were replaced, the storage tube did not maintain the required pressure value.
- In view of the previous incident, the SFISF staff examined an additional 48 storage tubes in search of similar problems. In the case of six storage tubes, leakage above the limit value was detected.

All events are classified as Level 0 according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). The direct cause of the events was damage to various seals. However, the investigations revealed that after an earlier, similar event, the internal regulation amendment requiring the preliminary detection of damage was not implemented by the deadline. After the first events, the root cause was not identified. The work required for further fault detection and repairs was minor but resulted in additional radiation exposure for the employees of SFISF.

Several events also occurred in the SFISF over a shorter period of time a few years ago: seven reportable events occurred in 2022. The events are not individually of great safety significance, neither now nor in 2022, but in their entirety they point to a systemic problem. The event investigations confirm that identical and similar events must be investigated together, corrective actions must be formulated accordingly, and older ones must be reviewed and supplemented in the light of more recent events. Multiple occurrences or series of events indicate problems in both the management system and the licensee's safety culture.

As a mid- and long-term measure, the PURAM has set out to identify the common root cause of the events and to improve mechanical protection during operations with storage pipes, as well as the detection of faulty tubes. The HAEA will also jointly handle the events and will also investigate their impact on safety culture and other areas at the SFISF.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

PARTICIPATION OF HAEA AT THE 10TH REVIEW MEETING OF THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

The tenth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, established within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was held in Vienna from April 13–24, 2026, where the Hungarian National Report was presented and discussed on April 17. Hungary was represented at the Review Meeting by a delegation led by Andrea Beatrix Kádár, President of the HAEA.

In addition to the HAEA, the delegation included representatives from the Ministry of Energy, MVM Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. and Paks II. Ltd.

At the Review Meeting, the rapporteur's report concluded that Hungary has successfully fulfilled its obligations arising from the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Three challenges were identified for Hungary: preparing for the further lifetime extension of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, including reviewing the relevant regulatory guidance and safety requirements; ensuring adequate workforce and competencies for current and future developments in Hungary's nuclear sector; and preparing a detailed legal and regulatory framework necessary for the deployment of small modular reactors. The following were recognized as good performance: legislative changes related to the new oversight concept, the 2024 safety culture year initiative of the HAEA, and the HAEA's special legal status and strengthened independence as a separate regulatory body.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE HAEA MET WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. NRC

A delegation from the HAEA, led by President Andrea Beatrix Kádár, visited the United States of America at the invitation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to attend its annual conference, held between 10 and 12 March, 2026. The event aimed to enable the exchange of information and professional dialogue between the US authority, licensees, industrial stakeholders and international partners on nuclear regulatory, safety and security topics, as well as application of new technologies.

During the visit, the Hungarian delegation held a bilateral meeting with Ho K. Nieh, President of the U.S. NRC and Commissioners Matthew J. Marzano and David A. Wright. Among other aspects the consultations provided an opportunity to review issues related to the further development of bilateral cooperation, experiences of regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, and regulatory tasks related to preparation for introduction of the small modular reactor technology.

The event also offered an opportunity for further technical consultations with European and international partners.

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN UKRAINE

In the first quarter of 2026, Ukraine's nuclear safety situation deteriorated seriously. The off-site power supply to the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) continued to be regularly disrupted during the armed conflict, with the plant losing all external power on multiple occasions and relying on emergency diesel generators. The IAEA maintained a continuous presence at the key Ukrainian facilities and brokered several temporary local ceasefires to enable essential repairs to the power infrastructure.

Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)

The ZNPP's off-site power supply was repeatedly placed in crisis during the first quarter of 2026. On 2 January, military activity damaged and disconnected the last remaining backup 330 kV line,

leaving the plant dependent on its sole functioning 750 kV main line. Through successful negotiations, the IAEA brokered five local ceasefires enabling six separate line repairs; the last of these was completed on 5 March, when the Ferosplavna-1 330 kV backup line was restored.

On 24 March, a further serious incident occurred: the plant lost its 750 kV Dniprovskaya main power line and was left operating solely on the backup line. The main line remained disconnected until April 2026, as the damage affected two locations along the frontline spanning the Dnipro River. Between 14 and 17 April, the ZNPP twice lost all off-site power – the 13th and 14th total losses of external power since the start of the war – when the Ferosplavna-1 backup line also tripped. In both cases, emergency diesel generators started operating and immediately provided the power supply.

The six reactors are in a shutdown state and cooling functions for the spent fuel pools continued without disruption. No increase in radiation levels was detected.

Chornobyl

The Chornobyl NPP site experienced several power supply disruptions during the last period. In January, military activity damaged an electrical substation, causing one 750 kV and two 330 kV lines to disconnect. On 14 March, an attack on a substation caused the 750 kV Kyivska transmission line to go offline for nearly 24 hours, automatically activating the emergency diesel generators. In all cases, remaining off-site power lines were able to secure the power supply and no increase in radiation levels was detected.

The protective functions over Unit 4 and the spent fuel storage facilities operated continuously. No increase in radiation levels was detected.

Khmelnyskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants

Intensive drone and missile activity has been observed in the vicinity of the operating plants. In February, a series of attacks on the electrical grid caused one reactor unit at an NPP to automatically disconnect from the grid, while several other units were forced to reduce output. The Chornobyl site experienced a complete loss of off-site power for approximately one hour, relying on emergency diesel generators. IAEA teams at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs were required to shelter in place on multiple occasions. Drone detections were also reported several times within the controlled areas of the plants.

The Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and South Ukraine nuclear power plants continue to generate electricity for Ukraine.

NUCLEAR SECURITY

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION AT HAEA

HAEA, together with the United States Department of Energy, the Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control and the so-called INFCIRC/908 international working group, organized a regional conference on insider threat mitigation, between 4th and 6th November 2025, at the HAEA headquarters. The event provided an opportunity for European experts to expand their knowledge, learn about good practices from other countries and develop regional cooperation in this specific area of nuclear security.

The conference was opened by the President of the HAEA, Ms. Andrea Beatrix Kádár, who emphasized in her speech the prominent role of nuclear security culture in the effective management of insider threat, and highlighted Hungary's commitment to international cooperation in this area. Hungary previously subscribed to the international Information Circular INFCIRC/908 aimed at addressing the threat posed by insiders, and the HAEA has been actively participating in the work of the related international working group ever since.

The three days of the event were built around different key topics, such as identifying critical roles within the organization and recognizing concerning behaviour, preventing and countering extremism, and regional cooperation. After the morning presentations and panel discussions participants could share their experiences, challenges, and solutions related to the daily topics.

The working group later published a publication summarizing the results of the presentations, group work and discussions, the lessons learned from the event, and the methods that can be applied in practice for the international nuclear security community. The publication can be reached through the following link: https://insiderthreatmitigation.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/NSD_2371_FLYER_INFCIRC908_HUNGARY_v6.pdf

The HAEA remains committed to international cooperation, thereby strengthening Hungary's nuclear security regime. Further information on the international Information Circular INFCIRC/908 and the related working group is available on their website: <https://insiderthreatmitigation.org/>